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Abstract 
The announcement of a trial of a National level internet filter in Australia has caused renewed interest in the 
arena of internet censorship. Whilst details on the schemes being tested have been fairly sparse the 
announcement of the trial itself, has drawn wide condemnation from privacy advocates throughout the world. 
Given this announcement it was decided to test and compare three of the most popular free tools available that 
allow for the bypassing of internet censorship devices such as those used within China. Tests were conducted 
using three software packages, Freegate, GPass and GTunnel which were analysed through packet capture to 
determine their likely effectiveness against the speculated methods to be employed by the Australian trials. The 
tests clearly showed that all three applications provide an easy means of subverting any likely filtering method 
with GPass and GTunnel the more suitable candidates as Freegate still allowed for plain-text DNS requests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Internet censorship in Australia is governed by a tangle of laws and regulation at both Federal and 
State/Territory level which is attributable to the lack of censorship and control powers granted to the 
Government in the Australian Constitution (EFA, 2008). Specifically the current legislation is focused as 
follows (ibid): 
• Commonwealth Level -  focused on Internet Content Hosts (ICH) and Internet Service Providers (ISP), 
but no regulation is specified for content creators or end users. This level of legislation allows powers 
for the Government or an appointed regulator to order providers and hosts to remove hosted content 
that is deemed “objectionable” or “unsuitable for minors”.  
• State / Teritory Level – focused on both ISPs/ICH and user level and differs from state to state and 
often allow for the prosecution of users for “making available” material that is deemed by legislation to 
be “objectionable”.  Beyond this some jurisdictions also apply a penalty for the viewing or 
downloading of such content.  
Recently, it has been noted that “[Australia’s] net censorship laws are more akin to those in totalitarian regimes 
than to those, if any, in other countries purporting to be Western democracies” (Libertus, 2008). Such claims are 
backed by Electronic Frontiers Australia who charge that “following extensive criticism by EFA and other 
organisations and individuals, it [Australian censorship] remains a draconian scheme unlike any existing or 
proposed laws in countries similar to Australia” (EFA, 2008). Whilst this issue may be seen as a relatively new 
reaction to the announced plans of the Federal Government (Marshall, 2008), a lot of the issues seen today relate 
back to the amendment of the Freedom of Information Act in 2003 (Comlaw, 2008). Whilst claiming to assist in 
the removal of objectionable content on the internet the result of the bill was to grant the government wider and 
unilateral powers in what could be deemed “objectionable” (EFA, 2008). 
As alluded to early the current plans of the Federal Government to trial and eventually impose mandatory 
content filtering at the ISP level has drawn a wide rage of criticism and concern (Dudley-Nicholson, 2008; EFA, 
2008; Libertus, 2008). With such concerns abounding it seemed to be an apposite time to explore and contrast 
freely available tools used to bypass internet censorship regimes in other countries and investigate their 
usefulness and speculate on their effectiveness against future Australian filtering schemes. 
SELECTION OF FILTER BYPASS SOFTWARE 
To carry out this investigation it was decided to select three of the most popular freely available programs that 
allowed for the bypassing internet content filters (Global Internet Freedom [GIF], 2008). The three chosen 
software applications were GTunnel, FreeGate and GPass, each of which functions in a slightly different 
manner, using different infrastructure or methods of bypassing internet content filters (GPass, 2008; Garden 
Networks, 2008; Dynamic Internet Technologies, 2008). 
GPass 
GPass is an anti-censorship application created by The World’s Gate Inc designed to bypass censorship methods 
used to filter out internet content (GPass, 2008). Initially released in July 2006, GPass is now one of the five 
most used anti-censorship tools and to date is also only one of two (the other being FirePhoenix) that claim to 
offer multi-protocol support such as Web 2.0, online multimedia, and communication tools such as email and 
instant messaging (Wang, 2008). According to its producers, GPass is able to bypass censorship devices such as 
the Chinese Great Firewall allowing anonymous web surfing whilst protecting the users identity and encrypting 
Internet communication, utilising a proprietary method to find an available server from the GPass server farm 
and then establishes an encrypted tunnel on the other side of the censorship firewall (GPass, 2008). The 
operation of GPass is illustrated below in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of GPass Operation (GPass, 2008) 
 
GTunnel 
The second toll selected for the investigation was GTunnel designed by Garden Networks for Freedom of 
Information, a small development house based Canada (Garden Networks, 2008).  The creators of the GTunnel 
software claim to have created the Garden Network and its front-end application, GTunnel, to provide users 
with anonymity while browsing the internet (ibid). GTunnel functions by providing a local SOCKS v5 or HTTP 
proxy on the host computer, which facilitates a connection to the Garden Networks server farm, the proxy is 
then automatically configured inside Microsoft Internet Explorer, which will send all browsing traffic through 
the secure proxy tunnel thus obfuscating the host computer IP address and anonymising http traffic. GTunnel 
operates in two modes of operation, namely TOR based and Skype based. These options effect the network used 
to first make the connection, in both cases the connections pass through GTunnel’s own servers prior to 
reaching its destination. In order to understand the consequences of each of these methods a brief introduction to 
the Skype and TOR networks is required. 
TOR operates by routing encrypted data through a series of TOR nodes, each of these nodes is operated by 
volunteers who wish to support (or undermine) the TOR network (Bugher, 2007). The last TOR node before the 
traffic continues out to it’s final destination is known as an ‘exit node’ the exit node is special in that it sees the 
traffic in the format intended to be received by the destination, this can often be unencrypted and insecure, 
whilst all the other nodes will only see encrypted data (ibid). The concept of a hostile exit node is nothing new 
and has in the past been used to intercept email and other passwords (Gray, 2007), GTunnel addresses the issue 
of hostile exit nodes by using its own servers as an encrypted proxy between TOR and the intended destination 
(Garden Networks, 2008).  
This however does not eliminate the risk associated with hostile exit nodes, it merely shifts the trust to another 
party, in this case Garden Networks. Skype is a peer to peer (P2P) based voice over IP (VOIP) service that is 
built specifically to bypass firewalls so that customers can make calls regardless of the filtering mechanisms in 
place (Schmidt, 2006). GTunnel uses an unknown method to make use of the Skype network in order to bypass 
content filtering networks, it should be noted that Skype makes use of encryption methods that should make 
decoding of data whilst it is within the Skype network unfeasible (Baset & Schulzrinne, 2004). 
 
In each of these cases Garden Networks is trusted to respect its users privacy as it is able to intercept 
unencrypted data passing through it’s network. However the use of the TOR mode of operation should prevent 
Garden Networks from determining the origin of this data (this is assuming that the unencrypted data itself does 
not provide this information). 
FreeGate 
The final application, Freegate is an anti-censorship program designed by Dynamic Internet Technology (DIT-
US), for use in countries where internet censorship occurs (Dynamic Internet Technologies, 2008). Dynamic 
Internet Technology has a strong affiliation with the United States Department of Defence for whom they 
created Dynaweb on which the Freegate application is based (ibid).  The software claims to be a secure and fast 
way of browsing the internet in relative security having the added feature of not requiring installation on the 
user’s system and  working without altering the host computers system settings (GIF, 2008). Freegate has two 
separate modes one to run in proxy mode, in which it automatically sets the IE proxy settings, the other defaults 
to Dynaweb servers overseas where you can browse websites straight through the mirror however this option 
limits its multi-protocol support (Dynamic Internet Technologies, 2008). It is claimed by Dynamic Internet 
Technologies that due to its method of bypass that, any program that is capable of using the SOCKS v5 proxy is 
capable of using Freegate to hide its traffic (ibid). 
TEST SETUP 
In order to provide a suitable testing framework, virtual machines were used to ensure that the test environment 
remained consistent and clean throughout. The host system was running VMware Server 1.0.6 on a Windows 
XP SP3 system. Two identical virtual machines were created which were running Windows XP SP3 and the 
following applications as well as the tool being tested:  
• Internet Explorer 7,  
• Mozilla Firefox 3,  
• VMware Tools 7.6.2,  
• uTorrent 1.8,  
• FileZilla Client 3.1.1.8,  
• Xchat 2.8.7c,  
• Windows Live Messenger 8.5.1302.1018,  
• Google Talk 1.0.0.104, 
 
VMware was configured to have only a host based virtual NIC. Therefore, the virtual NIC on the host machine 
acted as the gateway for the virtual machine. IP routing was then enabled on the Windows XP host system to 
allow Internet access to the virtual machine and Wireshark was installed on the host which was then used to 
capture packets originating from the VMware Virtual NIC thus ensuring all packets would be captured by the 
experiment. The setup is illustrated in figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2. Experimental Setup for Testing 
 
Before the testing was undertaken, a baseline of results were created using the same setup without the Bypass 
software application in order to allow an easy determination of the effects of the anti-censorship tool. 
Subsequently the experiments were conducted using the default setups for each application. Upon completion, 
these tests were then compared with the baseline tests using Wireshark 0.99.8 (Combs, 2008) and 
NetworkMiner 0.85 (Hjelmvik, 2008) to analyse the packet dumps and extract relevant information. 
RESULTS 
The results of each test were recorded in order to allow the software applications to be compared to each other 
and to the baseline in order to determine the effectiveness of these tools for the obsfucation of various protocols. 
 
Table 1. Results of Testing 
 Gpass FreeGate Gtunnel 
No Bypass 
Software 
Webmail Hidden Hidden Hidden Plaintext 
POP3 Hidden Hidden Hidden Plaintext 
SMTP Unknown* Unknown* Unknown* Plaintext 
Google Talk Hidden Hidden Plaintext/Hidden** 
Plaintext/Hidden*
* 
Windows  Live 
Messenger Hidden Hidden Plaintext Plaintext 
IRC Hidden Hidden Hidden Plaintext 
HTTP Hidden Hidden Hidden Plaintext 
HTTPS Hidden Hidden Hidden Plaintext 
FTP Hidden Hidden Hidden Plaintext 
BitTorrent Hidden Hidden Hidden Plaintext 
* Unable to be tested as none of the clients properly supported SOCKS  
** Conversations were hidden whilst protocol messages were not   
 
The results of testing are shown in Table 1 above, in each case the result of the test is listed as hidden or 
plaintext. Hidden specifies that the contents of the packets as shown in Wireshark and Network Miner appear as 
encrypted or otherwise obsfucated traffic. It should be noted that in every case where traffic was hidden in some 
way the protocol used appears to be SSLv3, this protocol is believed to be secure as long as the private 
certificate of the server is not known. If the private certificate is known it is possible to decrypt all traffic sent to 
and from the server in question. It may be seen that GPass and FreeGate are able to hide Google Talk and 
Windows Live Messenger whist GTunnel does not support these protocols. In each of the other tests all three 
solutions were able to hide the data sent across the network in the method specified. In each case the operational 
mode of the software (for example, TOR or Skype) had no impact the effectiveness of the software in any 
observable way. 
Aside from the observations presented in Table 1, it should be noted that FreeGate sends all DNS requests in 
plaintext across the network. It also makes use of the US Department of Defence (DoD) DNS servers, this may 
prove to be a security risk as the US DoD or any host in position to intercept traffic between the source and 
destination of these DNS requsts could determine the exact IP address of the computer originating the request as 
well as the details of the requested domain name. It is conceivable that this would render FreeGate to be 
unsuitable for bypassing some content filtering mechanisms if these track DNS requests to determine if illict 
content is being accessed. 
 
Table 2. Methods of bypassing different content filtering methods 
Content Filtering Method Filtering Bypass Method 
Filtering DNS requests Route DNS requests though an encrypted tunnel 
Filtering Web page contents Route web traffic through an encrypted tunnel 
Filtering IP addresses Route all traffic through an encrypted tunnel 
 
In order to evaluate each of the tools usage in terms of bypassing internet content filtering, it is first important to 
understand how each of these content filtering methods function. There are three main types of internet content 
filtering, these are, filtering DNS requests, filtering web page content and filtering IP addresses. In each of these 
cases there is a different method of bypassing these restrictions. These filtering methods and their corresponding 
bypass methods are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 3. Results of testing bypass tools against defined bypass methods 
 GPass GTunnel FreeGate 
Route DNS requests though an encrypted 
tunnel 
Supporte
d 
Supporte
d 
Not 
Supported 
Route web traffic through an encrypted tunnel Supporte
d 
Supporte
d 
Supported 
Route all traffic through an encrypted tunnel Supporte
d 
Supporte
d 
Supported 
 
The evaluation of each tool to determine which methods of content filtering is supported was conducted and the 
results displayed in Table 3. These results show that both GPass and GTunnel support all the defined methods 
for the bypassing of internet content filters, however FreeGate sends all DNS requests openly through the 
internet and as such it would be possible for a third party determine the domain names on which content may 
have been retrieved, but not the details of which content was retrieved as this is encrypted. It would also be 
possible for a content filtering system to intercept and block DNS requests for domains which are considered to 
be objectionable or otherwise undesirable by the governing body controlling the filtering system. Based on this 
analysis it can be seen that both GPass and GTunnel would allow for content filtering to be bypassed entirely, 
however FreeGate does not meet the DNS tunnelling requirement and as such may be unsuitable for accessing 
prohibited content when behind an internet content filtering system. 
CONCLUSION 
As outlined in this paper, there is an ever increasing trend in Australia towards draconian internet censorship 
and the latest moves by the Australian Federal Government to trial filtering methods at the ISP levels is another 
chip in the ever eroding idea on free speech on the net. Yet despite the claims of the Government that such 
measures will make the Internet safter, it would seem that anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of search 
engines would be able to locate free software to bypass such censorship.  
This study has found that three of the most popular free tools for ensuring internet privacy and bypassing 
censorship firewalls would likely function well against likely measures taken at the ISP level. This finding 
brings into question the need for such filtering, if the method for bypass is so simple and would actually make 
the detection of illegal activity from packet capture that much more difficult. Whilst it is easy to tout filtering 
measures as a ‘cure’ for objectionable material it will have little or no real effect on the access of such materials 
inside Australia to any but the most naive of users and will likely result in a degrading of the service speeds 
currently available to Australian internet users. 
Unfortunately, despite an initial outcry about the testing of these measures there has been little pressure put on 
the Government from the general public. One has to wonder whether the public will ever stand up to such 
inroads into blanket censorship or sit quietly as Australia joins the list of censored nations taking its place with 
China Iran, and Syria.  
REFERENCES 
Baset, S., & Schulzrinne, H. (2004). An Analysis of the Skype Peer-to-Peer Internel Telephony Protocol. Arxiv 
preprint cs.NI/0412017. 
Bugher, G. (2007, December 10th). Anonymity with TOR and its limits Retrieved November 4th, 2008, from 
http://perimetergrid.com/wp/2007/12/10/anonymity-with-tor-and-its-limits/ 
Combs, G. (2008). Wireshark (Version 0.99.8). 
ComLaw (2002). Communications Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1), from 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Bills1.nsf/0/011C0CDFB2CA36BECA256F7200246D
3E?OpenDocument&VIEWCAT=item&COUNT=999&START=1 
Dudley-Nicholson, J. (2008). Australia's compulsory internet filtering 'costly, ineffective', from 
http://www.news.com.au/technology/story/0,25642,24569656-5014239,00.html 
Dynamic Internet Technologies (2008). Freegate, from http://www.dit-inc.us/freegate 
EFA (2008). Internet Censorship Laws in Australia, from http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens1.html 
Garden Networks (2008). Garden Networks for Freedom of Information, from http://gardennetworks.org/ 
Global Internet Freedom [GIF] (2008). Global Internet Freedom Consortium – Our Solutions, from 
http://www.internetfreedom.org/Products-and-Services 
GPass (2008). Global Pass Home Page, from http://gpass1.com/gpass/about 
Gray, P. (2007, November 13th). The hack of the year Retrieved November 5th, 2008, from 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/security/the-hack-of-the-year/2007/11/12/1194766589522.html 
Hjelmvik, E. (2008). NetworkMiner (Version 0.8.5). 
Libertus (2008). Australia's Internet Censorship System, from http://libertus.net/censor/netcensor.html 
Marshall, T. (2008). Minister welcomes advances in internet filtering technology, from 
http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2008/060 
Schmidt, J. (2006, 15 December 2006). The hole trick - How Skype & Co. get round firewalls Retrieved 
November 6th, 2008, from http://www.heise-online.co.uk/security/How-Skype-Co-get-round-firewalls--
/features/82481 
 
COPYRIGHT  
Jason Smart, Kyle Tedeschi, Daniel Meakins, Peter Hannay & Christopher Bolan ©2008.  The author/s assign 
Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is 
used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide 
Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-
exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is 
prohibited without the express permission of the authors. 
 
